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Abstract 
The article explores the interaction between legal and political strategy in producing social change. It centres on a 
long-running dispute in Australia over whether charities can have a dominant political purpose. The focus is on the 
strategising of the small activist charity that successfully pursued the case over a five-year period. As an 'insider' 
account, the article charts the in-practice process of translating activisms across legal and political fields. With a 
stress on contingency and agency, the account affirms a 'politics of rights' approach to legal activism. It shows how 
the case opened-up new grounds for political contestation, and as such offered prospects for 'non-reformist reform'. It 
also demonstrates how this occurred more by strategic engagement with unintended effects, than necessarily by 
design. 
 
 
 
There has always been a difficult relationship between legal and political activism, especially in 
liberal democratic societies. Political legitimacy in such societies centres on the Lockean contract 
between the national state and its citizenry, and is played-out in various modes of rights framing. 
Here, political contestation is channelled into rights claims that reinforce legitimation structures. 
Legal reforms, though, may prefigure wider transformations: as Andre Gorz argued, ‘non-
reformist reforms’ can open up political spaces for mobilisation and broader forms of political 
claim-making (Gorz 1967, p.7; see Bond 2008). As argued here, the Aid/Watch case can be seen 
as an example of ‘non-reformist reform’, where a matter of minor legal irritation snowballed into 
a case that offers important political possibilities. As a battle between a small political charity and 
the machinery of the state, it affirmed political agency, demonstrating the possibilities as well as 
the tensions of fusing legal and political activism. In terms of the claims that were pursued, the 
case defines a new right to political ‘agitation’, whilst paradoxically affirming judicial structures. 
This article canvasses some of the dilemmas that arose during the conduct of the case, and is 
presented as a first-hand internal narrative.  
 
Aid/Watch is a small member-based non-government organisation (NGO), with an income of less 
than $100,000, which monitors the Australian Government overseas aid program. In 2006 the 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) disqualified Aid/Watch as a charity for having a dominant political 
purpose. For the following four years the organisation sought to overturn the ATO 
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disqualification. It was ultimately successful, achieving its goal without spending one dollar of its 
members’ donations. The case passed through five levels of appeal. Aid/Watch unsuccessfully 
appealed to the ATO in 2007, then in 2008 won its appeal at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT); the ATO successfully appealed against the AAT outcome at the Federal Court in 2009; 
Aid/Watch then successfully sought Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court. The High Court 
ruled in favour of Aid/Watch in 2010.  Significantly, the case gave the High Court the opportunity 
to extend rights to political communication in Australia, thereby transforming Australian charity 
law, lifting the common law ban on charitable political purposes. The insistence by one small 
NGO that it had the right to speak-out as a charity forced the extension of constitutionally-
entrenched rights in Australia.  
 
It should be noted the Australian Constitution does little to protect human rights. As the Human 
Rights Commission states, the constitution ‘offers only limited protection for a small number of 
discrete human rights’: the right to trial by jury, freedom of religion, the right to judicial review, 
the right to compensation for compulsorily-acquired property and the right not to be discriminated 
against on the basis of State of residency (Australian Human Rights Commission 2009, paras 114 
and 117). All other rights are subject to legislation and thus to limitation, the exception being the 
right to ‘freedom of expression in relation to public and political affairs’, commonly referred to as 
‘freedom of political communication’, recognised by the High Court from 1992 as a constitutional 
right arising from the necessity for political debate in representative democracy (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2009, para 118). In the High Court judgement for Aid/Watch this 
‘implied’ right to political communication trumped the ban on political purposes for charities. 
Communication was broadly defined to include ‘“agitation” for legislative and political 
purposes’, which the High Court defined as ‘constitutional processes which contribute to public 
welfare’ (High Court of Australia 2010d, para 45; also see Williams in this Special Issue). The 
Aid/Watch case therefore enacts a constitutional guarantee for political ‘agitation’, and in the 
process raises important questions as to how this right to agitate may be similarly applied to 
benefit other fields of political life.  
 
To help answer these questions, this article uses an ‘inside’ narrative to ask why this small 
organisation took on the task, and identify what factors enabled it to pursue the case. As a view 
from ‘inside’, the account is framed as a reflection on practice, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
draw out key themes and factors in the development of the case from an Aid/Watch perspective. 
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In doing so, the paper addresses dilemmas between legal and political activism, within ‘rights’ 
framing, and beyond it.  
 
As will become clear, there are many individuals from the NGO sector and amongst legal firms 
and in universities whose encouragement, sound advice and personal commitment played a 
central role in ensuring the case was pursued. One individual should be mentioned at the outset: 
the late Professor Mark Lyons, my former colleague at UTS, and authority on the not-for-profit 
sector in Australia, who encouraged us at every step. In 2003 he had commented ‘From time to 
time the ATO has stripped a nonprofit organisation of its charity status on the ground that it 
transgressed the lobbying prohibition. These occasions are few and attract no attention’ (Lyons 
2003, p.1). With Aid/Watch, between 2006 and 2009 he played a key role in proving himself 
wrong. Unfortunately he passed away before the Federal Court Judgement was overturned.   
 
Legal and political activism ‘in translation’ 
In capitalist societies formal legal equality is in permanent tension with substantive inequality: 
paradoxically, formal equality enforces and institutionalises real inequalities. The extension of 
legal rights, from property rights, to political, social and cultural rights, reflects the extension of 
liberal principles across social fields (Marshall 1950/1973). The deepening Lockean contract does 
not supersede substantive inequalities, yet it renders them politically visible and open to challenge 
(Woods 1995). That challenge may come ‘from within’, for instance in the form of legal activism; 
or it may come externally, through political activism.  
 
In debates about legal reform a continuum may be constructed between legal activism that limits 
itself to extrapolating existing legal principles, to political activism that aims to delegitimise the 
law, a form of immanent critique in the name of higher political norms. Legal activism seeks to 
extend rights observance, the assumption being that the legal regime can ameliorate the system 
that produces it. Taken alone, though, legal activism may enable de-radicalisation, cooptation and 
normalisation, entrenching the very power sources that are ostensibly being targeted (Lobel 
2006). The target of immanent critique is the political system as a whole, and the legislative 
process as part of it, rather than legal authority per se. Pearson and Salter describe it as an ‘effort 
to turn the normative standards that a legal ideology employs back upon the institutional 
procedures and actions which are supposed to embody these standards… [It] can involve taking a 
measure promising ‘equal’ rights ‘at its word’ even, or rather especially, where the underlying 
institutional intention was never to fully realise this ideal’ (Pearson and Salter 1999, p. 484). An 
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example is the call for ‘animal rights’ for ‘enemy combatants’ at the Guantanamo Bay military 
jail on the basis that dogs received better treatment at the jail than the human detainees (Zevnik 
2011). 
 
Clearly, legal and political activism can be linked. Legal activism on its own may proceed 
independently of political agency, but only within the existing legal framework. Shifting that 
framework requires political activism directed at publics beyond the immediate legal process. 
Immanent critique on its own is also inadequate: critiques may have wide political resonance, but 
are highly contingent. Extralegal activism, in a ‘sphere of alternative social activism’, may vacate 
the legal field in favour of a performative politics, which can lack traction (Lobel 2006, p. 981). 
Even if exposing contradictions forces regime change, a legal remedy is not guaranteed (and 
Guantanamo Bay may be a case in point).  
 
Most often, though, the problem is of legal cooptation, where political movements give way to 
legislative initiatives, with political aspirations subsumed by legal norms. The diversion of 
political conflict into the pursuit of rights norms, in particular, can offer slim pickings: two cases 
that have received attention in the US, for instance, are labour movement demands during the 
1930s New Deal era, and the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, both of which are said to have 
been de-radicalised in the face of the legal rights bestowed upon them (Lobel 2007). To guard 
against cooptation, Scheingold, in his classic 1974 text, argued for a focus on the ‘politics of 
rights’ rather than rights as abstract legal claims (Scheingold 1974/2004). The politics of rights 
rejects the distinction between law and politics and puts political-legal strategising in the driving 
seat, offering the possibility of more sustained transformation. Yet the balance is a difficult one, 
especially given the in-built elitism of the legal profession, in tension with political activism, 
which relies on the mobilisation of broader publics.  
 
Strategising between political and legal fields becomes a precondition for the kind of ‘non-
reformist reforms’ favoured by Andre Gorz. The alternation should perhaps be understood as a 
process of strategic ‘translation’, from legal into political fields and vice versa (Paris 2006, p. 
1029). Legal activism centres on the conduct of particular cases as they pass through various 
levels of judicial authority; political activism is also highly episodic, moving across issues and 
agendas according to the political process. The process of translation between the two is thus an 
active and on-going process of seeking to capture the agenda, a process which can be tracked and 
mapped. As a subjective engagement, the process involves individuals in strategic manoeuvres, in 
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seeking-out ‘strategic possibilities hidden within the concrete particularity of issues and 
movements’ (Hunt 1990, p. 361). What is attempted here is a personalised mapping, to draw out 
the twists and turns across political and legal categories in the process of building a snowballing 
‘non-reformist reform’. Before embarking on this narrative, the following section provides some 
context on issue of charities and politics in Australia.  
 
Charitable status and advocacy in Australia 
The conservative Coalition that governed Australia 1996-2007 came to power with a mandate to 
rule for the ‘mainstream’ against ‘special interests’, as represented by advocacy NGOs. NGO 
elites were seen as impinging on the capacity of elected governments to govern for the mass of 
the populace, undermining economic efficiency and distorting the workings of the market 
(Staples 2007; Phillips 2006). The Coalition explicitly identified advocacy NGOs as 
unaccountable and self-serving, and sought to reduce their influence (Mowbray 2003). NGOs 
dependent on government funding were especially vulnerable: these were deemed to have 
violated public trust if they publicly criticized government policy, and could only advocate for 
individual cases, chilling public debate (see Maddison and Hamilton 2006).  
 
Dependence on charitable donations from individuals and foundations was another source of 
vulnerability. Advocacy NGOs are often expert-based rather than member-based, and are 
particularly dependent on charitable status. For these organizations the capacity to establish and 
maintain a presence, and thus to influence the public sphere, can hinge on access to tax 
concessions. Government efforts to contain charitable status began in 2001, when the government 
initiated an inquiry into 'The Definition of Charities and Related Organizations' headed by a 
former judge, Ian Sheppard. The inquiry assessed what changes were necessary to ensure the 
legal definition of charities remained relevant to the contemporary environment, and 
unexpectedly recommended the definition of 'charitable purpose' be broadened. The inquiry found 
that advocacy could be a core element of charitable activity, provided it furthered or was 'in aid 
of... charitable purpose or purposes': any activity was acceptable provided it was not 'illegal', 
'contrary to public policy', or involved promoting 'a political party or a candidate for political 
office ' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001, p.108).  
 
In 2003 the Federal Government published its 'Draft Charities Bill', rejecting Sheppard's 
recommendations on advocacy. Within the Bill, under Section 8, a set of 'Disqualifying purposes' 
was created that included 'the purpose of attempting to change the law or government policy' 
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(Commonwealth of Australia 2003). The Government referred the Bill to the Federal Taxation 
Board for public consultation, and about 260 submissions were submitted, mostly from the 
charitable sector. For many of these, the Bill's impact on advocacy was a central concern. For 
instance, Philanthropy Australia, a peak group representing 217 organisations, argued that: ‘To 
exclude lobbying, advocacy or activities designed to achieve changes in government policy or 
legislation, is to take charities back 40 years. Such an exclusion would severely limit the 
effectiveness of many organizations…’ (Philanthropy Australia 2003). 
 
In its final report, the Tax Board described Section 8 as 'the most controversial section of the draft 
Bill’, and added, 'concerns about Section 8 reflect the view that the Section may operate to limit 
the advocacy activities of charitable bodies. Respondents saw this possibility as significant 
because of the widely-expressed view that advocacy is of vital importance to the operations of the 
modern charitable sector' (Federal Taxation Board 2004, p.13). A key issue was the relationship 
between activities and purposes, and the extent to which a disqualifying purpose could be inferred 
from activities (Federal Taxation Board 2004, p. 21). In May 2004, in the face of overwhelming 
opposition from charities and churches, and from the National Roundtable of Non-profit 
Organisations, the Federal Government shelved the Bill.  
 
With the legislative path blocked, the Federal Government moved to take the regulatory route. In 
2003 the government had commissioned the Institute for Public Affairs, a ‘free market’ think-tank 
which itself has tax-deductible status, to audit the federal administration of charitable status. The 
IPA had established its own ‘NGO Watch’ project in 2001, and was a vocal critic of advocacy 
NGOs. At the time, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad condemned the Government for funding the 
IPA’s ‘smear campaign against charities, welfare and aid agencies’ (Oxfam Australia 2003). The 
IPA’s Project promoted the idea that charitable NGOs needed to disclose more information about 
their activities to the authorities, as part of a new ‘protocol’. While the Government did not 
implement the Protocol, it did introduce new legislation that required charitable organizations to 
establish their credentials with the ATO in order to retain charitable status (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2004: Schedule 10 - Endorsement of Charities).  
 
The legislation came into effect in 2005, strengthening the ATO's role in policing eligibility, and 
in 2005 the ATO issued tax rulings to clarify what criteria would be used to test eligibility. 
Despite the efforts of many organizations, including the National Roundtable of Non-profit 
Organisations, the eventual ATO Rulings imposed new limits on charitable activity. In particular, 
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the ATO Ruling 2005/211 banned charities from having a purpose of ‘propagating or promoting a 
particular point of view’ (ATO 2005, para 102). This disqualifying political purpose could be 
inferred from the organisation’s activities: if such activity was deemed more than ‘incidental’ to 
the charity’s purpose, then the organisation would cease to be a charity. The ATO reserved for 
itself the right to characterize the extent of political activity, potentially enabling it to deregister a 
charity whenever it took a ‘point of view’.   
 
The Aid/Watch case from ‘inside’   
Aid/Watch was set up in 1993 with the main aim of forcing greater accountability from 
Australia’s agency for overseas development aid, AusAID. The ATO recognised Aid/Watch as a 
charity in 2000, and it was listed under the Register of Environment Organisations for Deductable 
Gift Recipient Status. I joined the Aid/Watch Committee of Management in 1998, having worked 
with the organisation in the successful campaign against the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment. By 1998 Aid/Watch had developed an organisational model that remains in place 
today, namely a focus on researching and campaigning with people affected by the Australian aid 
program. The organisation attracted a small but loyal membership base, many of whom provided 
tax-deductible donations, and it received several project grants from international charitable 
foundations.  
 
Aid/Watch Disqualification - 2006 
The ATO’s ‘Notification of Revocation of Endorsement as a Tax Concession Charity’ was issued 
to Aid/Watch in October 2006. The notice recognised that Aid/Watch objectives, as stated in its 
constitution, were charitable, and were fulfilled through a range of different research and 
education activities, including through the provision of advice to governments in Australia and 
overseas. However the ATO cited three activities of the organisation that it believed were not 
consistent with charitable status. These three 'political' activities were: urging the public to write 
to the Government to put pressure on the Burmese regime; delivering an (ironic) 60th anniversary 
birthday cake to the World Bank; and raising concerns about the developmental impacts of the 
US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. The ATO claimed the three activities were more than 
incidental to Aid/Watch’s charitable purpose and demonstrated that Aid/Watch had a ‘separate, 
political purpose’.1
 
 
                                                 
1 ATO, Notification of Revocation of Endorsement as a Tax Concession Charity, 2 October 2006.  
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The arrival of the ATO’s disqualifying letter sparked an intense debate within Aid/Watch. Given 
the ATO’s grounds for disqualifying Aid/Watch, there was a strong view that this was a political 
decision, driven by members of the government. During the decade of conservative rule, from 
1996, the Australian aid program had become increasingly politicized, and tensions between 
Aid/Watch and the government had sharpened. In 2006 for instance, Aid/Watch released research 
highlighting the misuse of Tsunami aid to Indonesia, and the Foreign Minister telephoned 
Aid/Watch offices, threatening to de-fund the organization (he was informed that under its 
constitution the organization could not accept government funding).  
 
The ATO, itself, denied any political motivation in disqualifying Aid/Watch. At a mediation 
session required by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in April 2008, the ATO refused 
to disclose how it had identified Aid/Watch from the 48,000 organisations that had tax-exempt 
charitable status. In a written response, the Australian Government Solicitor stated that to 
‘maintain the integrity of compliance programs’ the ATO could not reveal the ‘manner and 
method of selecting individuals and entities for audit’.2
 
   
Efforts at alerting the new Labor Government, that came to power in 2007, to questions of 
political bias, met with a similar response. Separate letters from Federal Ministers, Bob 
McMullan as Minister for International Development Assistance responding to a constituent, and 
Wayne Swan as Treasurer responding to Senator Brown, insisted the ATO was ‘independent’ and 
‘impartial’ (27 July 2007 and 15 January 2009 respectively). More detached observers of the 
process suggested that governments had kept the compliance system deliberately opaque, ‘as a 
useful weapon of bureaucratic discretion… a weapon they could wield against certain 
organizations’ (Lyons 2003, p.1).  
 
The actual character of the compliance program was inadvertently revealed at a November 2008 
Federal Inquiry into 'Disclosure regimes for charities and not-for-profits' when Deputy 
Commissioner Mark Konza told the inquiry that the ATO investigated Aid/Watch following an 
'intelligence lead' (Senate Standing Committee on Economics 2008, p. 22). Ironically, Mr Konza 
breached the ATO's own confidentiality obligations, and acknowledged he was doing so, when he 
agreed with a Senator that Aid/Watch was the only organisation denied charitable status on 
political grounds, claiming it 'was only engaged in political activity'. Intriguingly, Mr Konza 
appeared to acknowledge that a Liberal Senator, Senator Mason, had been the source of the 
                                                 
2 Australian Government Solicitor, Letter to Aid/Watch, 14 May 2008.  
54  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3s (Special Issue), 2011 
complaint against Aid/Watch. In a follow-up discussion Mr Konza also put on the public record 
that the ATO would initiate investigation of the groups involved in the ‘Make Poverty History’ 
campaign, and also the Wilderness Society should a formal complaint about these organisations 
be forthcoming from Senator Mason.  
 
These informal exchanges, recorded in Hansard, reveal much about the regime that was in place, 
despite the ATO’s official insistence that it was (and is) independent of government. This was the 
position put to Senator Brown in response to a series of questions he submitted to the Treasury on 
the Aid/Watch case and the apparent politicisation of the ATO. In response, the Treasury had 
stated that secrecy laws prevented the Tax Commissioner from raising individual cases with the 
Government (and vice versa). As such Treasury denied there had been any discussion with 
members of the Government about the ATO’s decision to launch a Federal Court appeal to 
overturn the AAT Aid/Watch decision. It insisted: ‘the Tax Office review of NGOs is based on an 
understanding of the legal requirements and is no way influenced by the Government’ (Senate 
Standing Committee on Economics 2009, para 5).  
 
Internal ATO Appeal - 2007 
The political context in which Aid/Watch was selected for disqualification influenced the 
approach taken internally. With the help of a pro-bono lawyer, Aid/Watch lodged an internal 
ATO appeal in late 2006 against the disqualification. In the meantime Aid/Watch also looked at 
the possibility of revising its constitution in order to make clear that its activities conformed to 
ATO guidelines. This conciliatory approach was forced off the table when the ATO responded to 
the Aid/Watch appeal by arguing that some of Aid/Watch purposes were disqualifying political 
purposes, as well as the three cited activities.3 Further, at a mediation later required by the AAT, 
the ATO refused to state what form of words would be required in order to meet their 
requirements: Aid/Watch would have to accept disqualification and reapply.4
 
 In light of the 
ATO’s response to the Aid/Watch appeal, an overall strategy coalesced around a political 
campaign to promote a legal challenge.  
First, though, Aid/Watch had to decide whether they indeed had any chance of success. After the 
ATO appeal Aid/Watch the pro bono lawyer stated they had ‘formed the view that Aid/Watch 
does not have a reasonable prospect of success in appealing’, and declined to continue assisting 
                                                 
3 Australian Tax Office, Reasons for Decision, Aid Watch Inc. Objection Reference 5567873.  
4 Aid/Watch, Notes from Aid/Watch Mediation, 30 April 2008.  
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the organisation.5
 
 The lawyer was from one of Australia’s leading law firms, and its decision to 
drop the case was a major blow. Fortunately, Aid/Watch was also being informally advised by 
several lawyers based within large charitable NGOs. These individuals played a key role in 
persuading Aid/Watch that it was worth taking the case further. Their strong recommendation was 
to appeal the case to the AAT as, if the appeal failed at the Tribunal, ATO legal costs could not be 
imposed on Aid/Watch. The question of financial liability for the Aid/Watch Committee of 
Management, at this stage, was therefore not a major concern. Given the risks were low, 
Aid/Watch began searching for a new source of legal representation.  
Aid/Watch now decided to politicise the ATO’s decision, to define it as a test case for the 
charitable sector as a whole. With no further hope of persuading the ATO to change its position, 
Aid/Watch planned to target the ATO as having made an arbitrary and politicized decision. This 
would strengthen support from the NGO sector, and help in sourcing legal representation. A wide 
range of development and environment charities were approached, and also other commentators, 
to brief them on the case. Specific journalists were contacted and a broadsheet news story was 
developed to coincide with a public announcement that Aid/Watch had been disqualified. 
Publicising the ATO disqualification was timed deliberately with a major Aid/Watch critique of 
the aid program: on 28 May Aid/Watch was in the media accusing the government of having 
manipulating the aid program; on 30 May a media story outlined how the organisation had been 
disqualified for its political activities (Jopson 2007; Wade 2007). Also, on 29 May Aid/Watch 
used a budget estimates hearing in the Federal Parliament to question the ATO, with the Greens 
Senator Kerry Nettle asking a range of questions of Michael D’Ascenzo, Commissioner of 
Taxation and Senator Nick Minchin (then Minister for Finance).6
 
 
The media visibility politicized the case, and a wide range of NGOs began raising concerns. A 
number of prominent aid charities asserted the importance of charitable advocacy for a 
democratic society. The chief executive of Oxfam, Andrew Hewett, stated the decision was 
negative for the sector, for public policy and for governance in Australia; the chief executive of 
World Vision, Tim Costello, stated advocacy was inseparable from charity, even in the most 
immediate and direct forms of humanitarian assistance (see Wade 2007 and ABC News 2007a). 
The peak aid NGO, the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID, ACFOA's 
successor), was concerned the case would send a 'disturbing, anti-democratic signal across 
                                                 
5 Aid/Watch Confidential Source, Lawyers Letter, 2 May 2007.  
6 The Commissioner stated that charities had to be engaged in the ‘direct provision of assistance’, claiming indirect 
advocacy was not charitable; see Senate Standing Committee on Economics 2007. 
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Australia’s large non-profit sector' (ACFID 2007). There was also a strong response from the 
social services sector, with the Chair of the National Roundtable of Non Profit Organisations, 
David Thompson, stating: ‘if we're to have a robust, transparent and effective democracy, we 
need organisations like Aid/Watch doing the homework’ (ABC News 2007b). The Chief 
Executive of The St Vincent De Paul Society, John Falzon, stated in an article devoted to the case 
that ‘we will never countenance a concept that charitable assistance should be separate from 
advocacy’ (Davies 2007).   
 
At the time, and after, Government hostility increased. The Secretary to the Treasurer, Peter 
Dutton, stated Aid/Watch was seeking to make ‘political mileage’ out of the ATO decision, 
demonstrating the ‘sort of organisation that they are’ (ABC News 2007b). When Aid/Watch 
released a report in June 2007 that criticized the use of Australian aid to gain access to the Iraqi 
wheat market, the Foreign Minister’s office simply labelled Aid/Watch ‘extremist’ (ABC News 
2007c). Nevertheless, the legal case was being seriously assessed by tax advisors and charity 
lawyers. Even a former ATO auditor raised concerns at the increasing politicization of the ATO, 
stating the case needed ‘to be examined by the external authorities’ (Seage 2007). In August 2007 
a not-for-profit briefing on the case from a Melbourne-based legal firm, Moores, stated: ‘pressure 
by the ATO on perceived political activities of charitable and especially overseas aid 
organizations is at odds with contemporary thinking that real change will come about when 
governments intervene to deal with the causes of poverty rather than alleviating the outcomes of 
poverty’ (Irvine-So 2007). It added: ‘The difficulty for charitable organizations is to work out 
when an ancillary activity may become so dominant that it becomes a purpose in itself. At the 
moment there is little guidance and the outcome of the Aid/Watch case will help. In the meantime 
there is danger in extensive or aggressive political activity…’ (Irvine-So 2007).  
 
Political visibility defined the case as a possible public interest test case, and helped Aid/Watch 
find pro bono legal representation with the progressive legal firm, Maurice Blackburn, through its 
‘Social Justice Practice’. This was a key stage in the case, as it later shifted the legal frame, from 
a largely tax and charity law focus into a constitutional context, offering broader possibilities for a 
legal remedy.  
 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal - 2008 
The AAT case was listed for June 2008; the AAT waived the application fee and the AAT 
President Justice Downes presided over the case. A mediation between Aid/Watch and the ATO 
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prior to the case hearing was required (against ATO objections). Rather than mediating the case, 
this further entrenched the legal dispute: the ATO now argued that because the Aid/Watch 
constitution sought ‘to ensure’ aid was more effectively distributed, then by definition it had a 
dominant political purpose. In their submission responding to the AAT appeal the ATO now 
argued that ‘all of the applicant’s objects seek to change law or policy’, and hence that all of the 
Aid/Watch purposes were political (ATO 2008, para 3.4). 
 
The AAT appeal was a major task for Aid/Watch as it required extensive evidence, linked to legal 
arguments that the organization conformed to the existing common law on the definition of 
charity. Importantly, the process of making the argument from within the existing legal 
framework was in some tension with the political stance that charities had the right to speak out. 
The legal argument at the AAT turned on whether Aid/Watch sought to propagandize for changes 
in the law, or undertook monitoring, research and campaigning to improve the administration of 
the aid program. In some respects, the organization would defend the right to do either or both of 
these: the argument that charities should be allowed to speak out does not discriminate on how 
they do this. At the AAT though, Aid/Watch argued its activities were not aimed at changing the 
law, but rather at helping the government implement AusAID’s policy commitment to alleviating 
poverty and promoting environmental sustainability.  
 
The two-day hearing involved two large legal teams, an Aid/Watch witness, and Justice Downes. 
The ATO had trawled through the Aid/Watch website, and had made several requests for internal 
documents, including funding applications, notes from planning sessions, and minutes of 
meetings. Several additional papers, mined from the Aid/Watch website, were unexpectedly 
tabled on the day. The judgement, when it came, was in favour of Aid/Watch: its purposes were 
found to be directed to the relief of poverty and the advancement of education, and also otherwise 
of benefit to the public; its political activities were found to be ‘encouraging’ the realization of 
existing government policy on aid, not ‘opposing’ it (AAT 2008: para 6). Significantly, the 
judgement explicitly stated that Aid/Watch did not have to distribute aid in order to be charitable: 
‘the objects are charitable notwithstanding the fact that Aid/Watch does not itself provide aid’ 
(AAT 2008, para 7). 
 
The AAT hearing was to prove invaluable as it set a benchmark establishing the ‘facts of the 
case’: in formal terms subsequent appeals could only be pursued on the basis of legal arguments, 
as against questions of fact. For Aid/Watch this was welcome, as it meant there would be no need 
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for further evidence to be presented. In large part, from then on, direct participation in the legal 
case was in the hands of the lawyers.  
 
 
Federal Court – 2009 
In responding to the AAT judgement the ATO insisted that Aid/Watch was still no longer a 
charity, and signaled it would appeal to the Federal Court. To overturn the judgement the ATO 
needed Aid/Watch to mount a defence, and hence had to concede that the matter was a test case 
for the sector. As such, the Aid/Watch legal defence at the Federal Court was funded from the 
ATO’s ‘Test Case Litigation Program’, and Aid/Watch was indemnified against the ATO’s legal 
costs. For the organization, then, the ATO’s Federal Court appeal had minimal impact: the case 
was defended against the ATO solely through legal arguments centring on charity law, and given 
the test case funding, there was no financial risk to the Committee of Management.  
 
The real risk, though, was that the ATO would succeed in their appeal, and this risk was now not 
simply to Aid/Watch, but to the sector as a whole. The case was being treated as a test case, and 
the ATO, in their submissions, were clearly seeking to deepen the ban on political charity.  
The ATO now argued that Aid/Watch could not have a purpose of relieving poverty as it provided 
no direct relief (ATO 2009, 4.2), and also that it could not have public education purpose as it 
failed to offer a ‘syllabus’ (ATO 2009, 4.3). As such, the ATO was now seeking to delimit the 
definition of charitable purposes as well as extend the scope of the political disqualification. At 
the AAT, Aid/Watch had successfully argued it was helping the government implement its own 
policies on overseas aid: at the Federal Court the ATO, quite remarkably, argued there was no 
such policy, that legislation ‘does not indicate that the present Australian Government supports 
overseas aid’ (ATO 2009, 2.8). The ATO also maintained its position, as expressed at the AAT, 
that Aid/Watch sought to ‘ensure’ the effectiveness of the government’s overseas aid program, 
and as such by definition had a dominant political purpose.  
 
The Federal Court judgement of September 2009 overturned the decision of the AAT and found 
in favour of the ATO. Significantly, though, it did recognise that Aid/Watch had a clear charitable 
purpose in aiming to alleviate poverty, and that it did this by monitoring the aid program (Federal 
Court 2009, para 20). It thus rejected the ATO’s claim that charities must be involved in directly 
alleviating poverty if they are to be defined as a charity. It also rejected the ATO’s argument that 
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conducting and publicising research, as undertaken by Aid/Watch, could not be defined as public 
education (Federal Court 2009, para 29).  
 
On the question of whether there was a disqualifying political purpose, though, the court agreed 
with the ATO, arguing that Aid/Watch had a dominant political purpose because its constitution 
seeks ‘to ensure’ that aid alleviates poverty. The Court fully accepted this argument: 
‘Aid/Watch’s attempt to persuade the government (however indirectly) to its point of view 
necessarily involves criticism of, and an attempt to bring about change in, government activity 
and, in some cases, government policy. There can be little doubt that this is political activity and 
that behind this activity is a political purpose. Moreover the activity is Aid/Watch’s main activity 
and the political purpose is its main purpose.’ (Federal Court 2009, para 39). What disqualified 
Aid/Watch, for the Court, was that it sought to ensure ‘that the delivery of aid should conform to 
its view’ (Federal Court 2009: para 41; bold in original). Attempting to influence the public to 
change government practices was now unacceptable, as well as attempts to directly influence the 
outcome of legislation or policy: as such, the Court substantially deepened the political ban 
(Federal Court 2009, para 47).  
 
Aid/Watch cried foul, stating the judgement narrowed the scope for charitable advocacy. 
Specifically, Aid/Watch argued the judgement was contradictory: as a charity Aid/Watch could 
devote itself to monitoring the aid program in order to educate the public and alleviate poverty. 
But it could not take a view on the aid program, begging the question of how it could fulfil its 
purposes. Responses from the media and from legal observers affirmed the broad anticipated 
impact on the sector, with concerns widely expressed: the Australian Financial Review reported 
‘Ruling threatens charities’, the Australian stated ‘Tax battle may affect advocacy bodies’; sector 
journals and think tanks responded in a similar way, and senior charity lawyer, Murray Baird, 
flagged the necessity for a High Court appeal (Jacobs 2009; Callick 2009; ABC Radio National 
2009; Third Sector Magazine 2009; The Australia Institute 2009).  
 
The Judgement was certainly a very negative outcome for the sector. There was always a risk that 
the Aid/Watch case would give the ATO an opportunity to further tighten charity law. Such a 
possibility had been discussed internally at Aid/Watch before the decision to proceed with the 
AAT appeal: lawyers based in the larger NGOs had stated that the 2006 Notification itself had 
established a precedent, and that it had to be challenged. But now the stakes had risen 
substantially: a Notification, or indeed a failed AAT appeal would have had less significance than 
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a Full Federal Court Appeal Judgement. Clearly, for the sector as a whole, the situation had 
deteriorated.  
 
Application for Leave to Appeal to the High Court – 2009 
If it was important to contest the original ATO Notification, then certainly it was vitally important 
to find a way to overturn the Federal Court Judgement. But if the legal stakes had risen, then so 
had the financial stakes. If Aid/Watch was to appeal to the High Court it would first have to apply 
for Special Leave to Appeal. This in itself, if it failed, could leave Aid/Watch liable to pay the 
legal costs of the ATO. The Government Solicitor had already indicated that it would seek to 
recover these costs, which were estimated as in the order of $70,000. The Aid/Watch Committee 
of Management had to find a risk-free means of appealing to the High Court or face a financial 
liability. Under the NSW rules of incorporation individual members of management committees 
are personally liable if a debt is incurred when ‘there are reasonable grounds to expect that the 
association will not be able to pay’ (NSW Government 1984, article 38.1). To deal with this, the 
management committee held specific meetings on the issue, and ensured that the organization’s 
strategy for minimizing the risks was thoroughly minuted.  
 
The strategy came in two parts. The first element was to approach the NGO sector and seek a 
financial ‘backstop’ of at least $70,000 to insure Aid/Watch against any possible liability incurred 
by applying to appeal to the High Court. The second element was to decide that Aid/Watch could 
not proceed with the High Court appeal if the ATO failed to provide test case funding. The ATO 
had refused test case funding for the Application for Special Leave to Appeal, but there had been 
some informal suggestion that if the special leave application was successful then a request for 
test case funding would be looked at more favourably.  
 
In mid 2009 the management committee sought to raise the guarantees from NGOs. In terms of 
the legal arguments, Maurice Blackburn and the barristers had listed a series of reasons why the 
application was likely to be successful. The Federal Court itself had prefigured a High Court 
appeal, stating ‘this area of Australian law is informed by concepts which, due principally to their 
antiquity, are not easily adapted to the modern context’, emphasising that 'as an intermediate 
appellate court' it was limited in its capacity to do this (Federal Court 2009, paras 9 and 45). 
Additionally, the case had sector-wide implications, and was in an area of legal uncertainty. Most 
important, following the Federal Court judgement, the case now hinged solely on the question of 
political purposes.  
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The response from NGOs was encouraging: about fourteen organizations were formally 
approached, and only two were unable to provide a guarantee. The organizations were in the main 
from the overseas development and environment sectors, and all agreed that given the Federal 
Court judgement, a High Court appeal had to go ahead. In addition, several other organizations, 
including the St Vincent de Paul Society, and peak organizations such as ACOSS and ACFID, 
agreed to write to the High Court urging it allow the appeal to go ahead. With the $70,000 
guarantee in place, the Aid/Watch management committee made the decision to go ahead with 
seeking special leave to appeal.  
 
At the hearing itself, in March 2010, the Court asked little of the Aid/Watch side, and instead 
focused on the ATO and its team of lawyers (which were now headed by D.M.J. Bennett QC, 
former Solicitor-General for the Howard Government). The Court agreed with Aid/Watch that 
there were grounds for the High Court to consider whether or not the Australian Taxation Office 
should have revoked charitable status in 2006: Justice Gummow did not agree with the ATO 
argument that this was an ‘inconvenient vehicle’ for a test case, and asked of the ATO, ‘what is 
offensive in influencing government?’ (High Court of Australia 2010a). The Court noted that the 
role of government in addressing poverty had significantly changed over the past 150 years and 
agreed that the appeal should go ahead.   
 
High Court Appeal – 2010 
With the High Court appeal pending, the financial risk to Aid/Watch had multiplied. If Aid/Watch 
lost the High Court appeal, the Government Solicitor would most likely seek to recover costs, 
both from the appeal and from the special leave application, a total bill approaching $300,000. 
Aid/Watch lawyers again submitted an application to the ATO for test case funding, this time 
arguing that given the High Court would now hear the appeal, the case had indeed become a test 
case for the sector.  
 
Ironically enough, Aid/Watch was unable to take its appeal against the ATO without the ATO 
funding. If the ATO refused to fund the case, Aid/Watch could have argued the ATO was denying 
natural justice, as the ATO had used test case funding to overturn the AAT outcome. Aid/Watch 
could also have argued the case demonstrated the necessity for legislation. But even then, the 
financial prospects were not good: even if Aid/Watch had dropped the case, it could still face the 
possibility of a $70,000 bill from the ATO (and it seemed unlikely the NGOs that had supported 
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the special leave application would be willing to waste funds on an appeal that was never 
pursued).  
 
For a fortnight the ATO considered the test case funding application: Aid/Watch sought to exert 
some pressure, releasing details of the financial ‘backstop’ and stressing widespread NGO 
support for the case to be heard, which were reported extensively in the Australian (Callick 
2010). It was only on the evening of the Thursday before the 2010 Easter Bank Holiday that the 
Aid/Watch lawyers finally took a call, from the Assistant Commissioner himself, saying that after 
some deliberation, the ATO had decided to fund the case. This was an important moment for 
Aid/Watch. With the ATO funding the case, Aid/Watch was assured its lawyers would be paid, 
and that Aid/Watch would be indemnified against the ATO’s costs should the appeal fail. 
Maurice Blackburn could prepare the full High Court appeal.  
 
At this stage Aid/Watch was still arguing within the frame of charity law, that charitable activity 
could be political and should not be construed as a dominant purpose. In late 2010, for instance, 
Aid/Watch had made a submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into ‘The 
Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector’, arguing that the government should adopt the 
Sheppard Inquiry recommendations so that charities could engage in ‘lobbying, research and 
monitoring’ as well as direct service provision (Goodman 2009). In hindsight, Aid/Watch had 
begun to believe its own legal arguments, basing the approach on the existing charity law, rather 
than on in-principle commitments. What had been a legal strategy in the service of a political 
principle had become a legal dispute on the finer points of charity law.  
 
The appeal papers submitted to the High Court – both the Application for Special Leave to 
Appeal, and the Appellant’s Submissions – directly challenged the extension of the political 
disqualification rule under the Federal Court judgement. The special leave application argued that 
‘many Australian charities indirectly attempt to influence government’, and thus are endangered 
by the Federal Court judgement, posing a ‘substantial risk of grave injustice in the future’ 
(Aid/Watch 2009, paras 44 and 45). The Respondent’s Submissions, from the ATO lawyers, 
argued that the ‘political disqualification principle’ applied at any ‘level of generality’, whether in 
terms of overall goals, means, or activities (ATO 2010, paras 7 and 39).  
 
To resolve this problem, the Aid/Watch submissions made a positive constitutional argument in 
favour of the public benefit of political debate. The Federal Court Judgement had stated the Court 
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could not usurp the legislative political process and sit in judgement over the merits or otherwise 
of the points of view promoted by Aid/Watch: it simply ruled them to be political and the 
organisation to be uncharitable. Aid/Watch submissions to the High Court sought to up-end this 
argument, stating that political debate is by definition in the public benefit. Submissions cited the 
implied right to freedom of political communication, established by the High Court since 1997, 
that ‘recognises the public benefit in the dissemination and receipt of information, opinions and 
arguments concerning political matters which affect the people of Australia’ (Aid/Watch 2009, 
para 31). The claim that promoting public debate on political issues is by definition in the public 
benefit was sharply contested in the respondent’s submissions, which asserted ‘mere discourse is 
not a public benefit’ and argued the High Court had not ruled political debate should be supported 
by tax-exempt charitable status (ATO 2010, paras 52 and 53). 
 
Here, the Aid/Watch lawyers and barristers raised the legal stakes beyond these limits of charity 
law, and very effectively reframed the case. In part this reflected the High Court jurisdiction, 
where broader questions of political principle could be translated into legal arguments around 
constitutional rights. It also reflected the public interest focus of the lawyers, and the extent to 
which they were able to reframe the case in constitutional terms. In the process, at the High Court 
hearing they were able to capture the legal agenda, and put the ATO lawyers onto the defensive.  
 
As a result of this reframing, the High Court appeal itself centred largely on the Aid/Watch 
argument that silencing charities was an unwarranted restriction on freedom of political 
communication (High Court of Australia 2010b). In its own terms, the ATO’s political 
disqualification prevented charities from having a dominant political purpose, and as such 
delimited political communication. Not surprisingly, the ATO preferred a very broad definition of 
what constituted ‘political’ activities, and hence what could be construed to be a dominant 
political purpose. The result was a direct and extensive constraint on political communication for 
any organisation holding charitable status.  
 
Aid/Watch lawyers argued that the common law disqualification only applies to purposes 
contrary to public policy, rather than much broader political purposes. This public policy 
disqualification would simply require that charities not act in ways that are contrary to the law. 
The Aid/Watch lawyers argued this latter constraint was already established in the case law, and 
would be more suited to the Australian constitutional context. Members of the bench were 
concerned that the public policy approach may allow political parties to gain charitable status – a 
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point answered by Aid/Watch barristers, who suggested the courts could disqualify political 
parties on the basis that charitable status would entrench a political party in office. This would 
contravene the constitutional commitment to representative democracy, and thus would be 
contrary to public policy.  
 
The ATO’s main objection to the argument that political disqualification violates the doctrine of 
freedom of political communication was that the doctrine is recognised by the High Court as a 
negative freedom, not a positive freedom. The ATO is thus not obliged to use its charitable tax 
concessions to encourage freedom of political communication. Charitable status, the ATO argued, 
is simply a privileged status awarded to certain categories of organisation that perform a 
particular role in society (High Court of Australia 2010c). The problem for this argument was that 
the legislature had in 2004 itself chosen not to define charitable status in Australia. As such, 
members of the Bench stated the High Court should not concern itself with the legislative context 
– it was an irrelevance.  
 
Crucially, then, the High Court was free to develop the common law in the area. In doing so it 
would not in any way usurp the role of the legislature: the legislature had opted-out. The ATO 
lawyers very strongly objected to this argument, suggesting that the consequences could be very 
negative in terms of lost revenue if the political disqualification rule was lifted, as a result of 
many more organisations qualifying for charitable status. This claim was literally ruled out of 
court, as a matter for the ATO, not for the High Court.  
 
The remainder of the ATO’s defence centred on whether or not Aid/Watch acted in the public 
benefit. A distinction was drawn between biased political speech, attributed to Aid/Watch, and 
genuine efforts at raising issues in ways that do not prejudge outcomes. An analogy was drawn 
between propagandizing and debating. In making these points the ATO repeatedly referred to 
specific viewpoints adopted by Aid/Watch. Despite being informed by the Bench that freedom of 
political communication was a freedom to engage in any form of legal political rhetoric, the ATO 
returned repeatedly to the content of Aid/Watch materials (High Court of Australia 2010c). Each 
time this was attempted, the Bench responded by asking how this was relevant, pointing out that it 
was not the role of the High Court to rule on the content of political communication, but simply 
on the freedom to engage in it.  
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A similar move emerged with the ATO’s argument that Aid/Watch did not serve the public 
benefit. The ATO barrister spent some time asserting that Aid/Watch was not effective in 
discharging its responsibilities, and that this meant it could not be described as having public 
benefit. The Bench responded by asking how the question of effectiveness was relevant to 
purposes. Again, it appeared the ATO’s main reason for making these assertions was to discredit 
Aid/Watch in a context where the organisation could not effectively respond.  
 
The key argument remained: the common law of charity in Australia had to move with the times. 
Given the legislature had failed to act in this area, it was up to the High Court to resolve a 
potential clash between the constitutionally-entrenched freedom of political communication, and 
the existing law of charity. One had to give way to the other.  
 
The majority judgement, 5-7, when it came in December 2010, favoured the constitutional norm: 
it overturned the Federal Court judgement, finding in favour of Aid/Watch, and updating the 
common law on charity to make it consistent with freedom of political communication. Departure 
from English common law was necessary as it had not been developed with regard to the 
‘Australian system and government established and maintained by the Constitution itself’; 
reflecting that system, the High Court ruled that ‘the generation by lawful means of public 
debate… itself is a purpose beneficial to the community’ (High Court of Australia 2010d, paras 
40 and 47). In the process, the High Court established a distinctive Australian law on charitable 
advocacy, of great significance both for the sector and for broader questions of political 
engagement and ‘agitation’ in Australia, and internationally; as The Australian put it, ‘the 
‘implied right is back in business’ (Pelly 2010).7
 
 
Conclusions  
The narrative reveals an oscillation between legal and political spheres during the conduct of the 
Aid/Watch case, from 2006 to 2010. That oscillation continued after the High Court judgement as 
Aid/Watch and others sought to ensure that the ATO implemented the judgement in a way that 
would lift the political disqualification for all charities. The importance of this was made clear at 
public forums held in Melbourne and Sydney in early 2011, where some of the ambiguities in the 
                                                 
7 The case was cited as having implications for other jurisdictions, notably in New Zealand and the UK, see Wiggins 
2011.  
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judgement were highlighted and debated.8
 
 The forums were significant as they demonstrated that 
the sector’s expectation was that the ATO should now permit a dominant political purpose for all 
charities. In the event the ATO fulfilled this expectation.  
The ATO’s draft ruling on charities issued in May 2011 responded to a range of High Court cases 
on charitable status, including the Aid/Watch case. In terms of political purposes, the draft ruling 
simply lifted the political disqualification: it stated that ‘following the High Court’s decision in 
Aid/Watch… an entity can be charitable if it has a purpose (including a sole purpose) of 
generating public debate with a view to influencing legislation, government activities or 
government policy in relation to subject matters that come within one or more of the four heads of 
charity’ (ATO 2011a, para 68(i)). Importantly, there was no requirement to present a balanced 
position: ‘an entity does not necessarily have to present a balanced position in order to be 
considered an entity with a purpose of generating public debate’ (ATO 2011a, para 68(iii)). There 
was some uncertainty about areas of public policy and public debate that may sit outside the four 
heads of charity, to be decided ‘on a case by case basis’; there was also a requirement that 
charitable political purposes involve public debate, not private lobbying, and not party-political 
activity.  
 
After a period of public consultation the finalized ruling was released in October 2011, replicating 
much of what appeared in the draft version, at least in respect of the Aid/Watch case (ATO 
2011b, paras 70-74). There was even some further loosening of the political constraints, with the 
mention of lobbying dropped from view, and the ban on associating with political parties 
confined to organizations that have this as their ‘sole purpose’ (ATO 2011b, para 72). As such, 
the ATO ruling, finalized in October 2011, confirmed that the Aid/Watch case produced a 
significant change in the Australian law of charity. But the story was by no means over, with the 
Government seeking to revive the statutory route that had been abandoned in 2003.  
 
In parallel with the High Court case, in the May 2011 budget the Government had initiated its 
own process for developing a statutory definition of charitable status in Australia. The new 
                                                 
8 The papers in this Special Issue were presented at two of these forums. The first was held at the Melbourne Law 
School in February 2010; the second was hosted in Sydney by the UTS Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Research 
Centre. There were two further forums, with input from the ATO, organised by ChangeMakers Australia, which also 
made several submissions to the ATO on the issue. See: www.changemakers.org.au  
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statutory definition of charity was to be revenue neutral9 and was to be ‘based on the 2001 Report 
of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, taking account of the 
findings of recent judicial decisions, such as Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of 
Taxation’ (Treasury 2011, 37). In late October 2011 the Treasury opened public consultations on 
the basis of a paper, leading to an exposure draft of legislation in 2012. Surprisingly, instead of 
using the 2001 Sheppard Inquiry, Treasury chose to ‘base an Australian statutory definition on the 
work already done on the Charities Bill 2003’, a Bill that had been widely discredited (Treasury 
2011, para 41).10
 
 Reflecting the 2003 Bill, Treasury sought to elevate a strengthened ‘public 
benefit’ test, which could have the effect of cancelling-out the High Court insistence that public 
debate on matters of public policy has an intrinsic public benefit (Treasury 2011, para 111).  
While the issue of charitable advocacy has moved back into the political sphere, certain 
constitutional safeguards had been put in place. The Aid/Watch High Court ruling relied upon the 
implied freedom of political communication, and was grounded in Australian constitutional law 
as much as in the common law of charity. As such, any statutory definition of charitable status 
would have to comply with the constitutional protection of public debate on political matters. 
Nevertheless, ensuring such protection is vested in the statutory provisions would no doubt 
require continued political pressure and possibly still further legal activism. The necessity for 
ongoing ‘translation’ across political and legal fields remains in place. But most important, if the 
new rights to political expression and ‘agitation’ are not claimed and tested by existing charities, 
and indeed by political organizations seeking charitable status, they will surely wither on the vine.  
 
Setting aside the on-going drama of defining charitable status, this account of legal and political 
activism by one small NGO has been aimed at detailing the contingent character of the political 
and legal process. Nothing in this narrative was given from the outset – the foundations for legal 
change were created in the process of contestation. As such, what the narrative reveals is a 
process of strategizing and translating across legal and political fields in order to accumulate 
forms of leverage. There is no evidence here that political pressure influenced the legal outcomes, 
rather, we see political activism laying and re-laying the foundations that enabled various levels 
                                                 
9 The new Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, which was to oversee the implementation of the new 
definition, was expected to generate $41m in tax revenue over four years; one legal firm speculated that the only 
means of achieving this would be for Treasury to ‘narrow the scope of charitable activity in its definition of Charity 
and have the Commission take a hard line’; see Corney and Lind 2011. 
10 Perplexingly, para 41 claims: ‘This approach is broadly consistent with Recommendation 7.1 of the PC 
[Productivity Commission] Report that the Australian Government should adopt a statutory definition of charitable 
purposes in accordance with the recommendations of the Charities Definition Inquiry’ (Treasury 2011, para 41).  
68  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3s (Special Issue), 2011 
of legal intervention. Clearly one side of the equation could not proceed without the other: the 
lawyers had to develop strong legal arguments for the case to succeed, but likewise, nothing 
would have happened without the stubborn insistence of Aid/Watch that it had a case to answer.  
 
In fact, one might argue that the redefinition of charitable status in Australia would not have 
happened unless Aid/Watch had so successfully antagonized the government of the day. If 
Aid/Watch had not signed up for the release of political prisoners in Burma, not joined the 
campaign against the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement and not delivered an ironic birthday 
cake to the World Bank, the ATO would never have revoked its charitable status. The political 
disqualification, that now we understand to be unconstitutional, would still be in place. The 
simple lesson is that activism can produce results, both intended and unintended.  
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